The rise of the global south: paper presented at FLACSO, Argentina, September 2008 by Rehbein, Boike
www.ssoar.info
The rise of the global south: paper presented at
FLACSO, Argentina, September 2008
Rehbein, Boike
Preprint / Preprint
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rehbein, B. (2008). The rise of the global south: paper presented at FLACSO, Argentina, September 2008.. Freiburg
im Breisgau. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-29824
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
The Rise of the Global South 
Paper presented at FLACSO, Argentina, September 2008 
Boike Rehbein 
 
In my paper, I wish to make two related points. First, the rise of the global South is the 
most significant change in the social world since British industrialization. Second, this 
has implications for the social sciences. I wish to advance the two points in four steps. 
First, I outline some traits of our conventional social sciences. Then I explain why they 
don’t fit the rise of the global South any more. In the third section, I will briefly sketch 
some elements of the social world after the rise of the global South. Finally, I will draw 
some conclusions for social theory. 
 
Eurocentric theory 
Our social sciences are based on a view of the social world that I would call Eurocen-
tric. The view comprises, among others, the following characteristics: an ethnocentric 
writing of history, an evolutionism, a container model of society, an economism and an 
empirical focus on European societies. These characteristics are rooted in the develop-
ment of the social sciences in the late eighteenth century. The social sciences grew out 
of economics and philosophy precisely at the time when Europe acquired dominance of 
the world. The rest of the world came under European rule and seemed obliged to fol-
low the model of European development. Therefore, it was almost self-evident to look 
at the emergence of modern Europe in order to understand the social world. 
The foundation of the Eurocentric view is an ethnocentric writing of history. Since 
European Enlightenment, history books start with a general prehistory and the rise of 
the early Oriental civilizations. The first civilizations then culminated in the first real 
culture that included science, democracy and freedom, that of Greece. From there the 
torch of civilization was passed on to Rome and the Dark Ages to the enlightened, capi-
talistic and democratic Northwestern Europe that came to dominate the whole world. 
That means, the entire history is interpreted as a prehistory of Europe, as can be seen in 
the writings of Hegel and Marx, Luhmann and Habermas. 
Ethnocentric history went along with an evolutionism. As all history was a prehistory of 
Europe, it supposedly reached its fulfilment in modern Europe – later the “end of his-
tory” was reached in the perfection of European civilization in the United States. All 
social sciences presupposed that all non-European societies were underdeveloped, 
lacked certain essential civilizational traits and had to imitate the European model in 
order to become developed. 
According to European reality from the late eighteenth to the early twenty-first century, 
the social sciences looked at nation states as their units of analysis. Ulrich Beck has 
called this the “container model of society”. According to this model, society is con-
tained within the borders of a nation state like rice in a bowl. And like the rice grains in 
the bowl every individual within the society has one and only one social position. We 
can draw lines between groups of individuals to arrive at classes or strata. 
The basis of this classification of individuals is their economic standing. The criteria for 
determining the social position have been economistic: We look at the profession, the 
wealth and/or the income. This again is linked to the development of the social sciences 
in line with European capitalism. Formally free wage-labour and income became fun-
damental criteria for social life only in modern European capitalism. 
These four characteristics are linked to the empirical focus on modern European socie-
ties. Therefore, we might call our social sciences provincial and chauvinistic. We either 
don’t care what the rest of the world looks like or we just apply the models derived from 
research on Europe to all other societies. 
This game is over now. The domination of Northwestern Europe and subsequently of 
the United States has come to an end. That means that Western modernity cannot be the 
model for the entire world. Second, unilinear evolution towards the European model 
may not be the correct way of interpreting history. Third, the container model applies 
only to the very brief period of European domination. Fourth, the economism is linked 
to European capitalism, which also characterizes only a brief period of a small region. 
Finally, Europe and the United States are merely two regions among many today. 
Therefore, our social sciences could be viewed as area studies of Northwestern Europe 
and the United States. 
 
The Rise of the Global South 
To apply European and Northamerican area studies to the rest of the world seemed con-
vincing as long as the entire world was a European colony and forced to comply would 
European models. The United States seemed to continue this civilizational programme. 
From this perspective, one could think that European modernity and capitalism could 
have developed only in Europe and had to be exported to the rest of the world. How-
ever, new research shows that virtually all traits of European modernity were developed 
in China much earlier than in Europe, such as capitalistic economic behaviour, a free 
labour market, paper money, a monetarized tax system, competitive free markets, ex-
cess capital and heavy industry. 
• If we look at the thirteenth or the sixteenth century or even at ancient times, we 
see large regions of the world trading with each other. In all of these regions, some peo-
ple produced for the market and sold the products to capitalistic merchants who traded 
them over short and long distances. None of the regions dominated the world even 
though there were centres and peripheries. Europe entered the multicentric world as a 
latecomer in antiquity (Greece and Rome) and in modernity (especially England) to 
achieve dominance for a brief period. This dominance was dependent on the existing 
trade systems and their conjunctures. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a de-
cline of the great Asian empires corresponded to a rise of Europe, which was partly due 
to the use of African slaves and American resources. On this basis, Europe was able to 
reach a dominant position in the world. 
• It is very unlikely that Euro-American dominance continues. In many areas, the 
global South catches up or takes the lead. If we compare shares of global GDP, we see 
that they start getting back to normal. 
The global South’s share in world production is increasing dramatically, from five per-
cent in 1950 to twenty percent in 1997 and almost thirty percent today. In many fields 
of production, China has become number one, especially in heavy industries. China is 
also the number one recipient of foreign direct investment. This rise of China also en-
tails, as we all know, a rise in prices of primary goods and therefore an improvement in 
the financial and political position of the producers that are mainly in the global South. 
Financial markets in China and India are starting to attract capital volumes that are 
comparable to Western countries. Finally, IMF and World Bank have lost their influ-
ence on the global South. There are just too many dollars in Caracas and Beijing. These 
dollars are used to invest in the global South and to finance the US economy. 
Beyond the economy, the global South is gaining political ground. Without Mercosur 
and ASEAN or G20 and BRICSA, no international agreement can be reached. The 
global South is forging alliances against the North. Furthermore, education in the global 
South is becoming competitive – as we can see here at FLACSO. States like India and 
China and Argentina are raising their educational budgets while the US and Europe are 
decreasing it. The result is an increasing number of Nobel prize winners, IT specialists 
and high-ranking universities, especially from India. Finally, in terms of demography 
the global South has an advantage that will have an increasing impact. Populations in 
the global South do not only enjoy an increasing level of education – for example, the 
percentage of people holding a university degree is higher in Argentina than in Ger-
many – but they are also much younger. 
For the time being, the global South continues to emulate models from the global North. 
And it does not form a powerful opposition yet. States in the South are still too weak to 
come up with true alternatives – even though the Olympic Games in Beijing were meant 
to precisely prove the opposite. Furthermore, states in the South are encountering huge 
problems, such as inequality, low per-capita incomes, political fragmentation, weak 
financial markets and resource constraints. Finally, military dominance of the US (that 
spends half of the world’s defence budget) remains undisputed. 
 
Return of the Multicentric World 
In spite of the South’s problems, Euro-American dominance and unilateralism belong to 
the past. We are seeing the return of the multicentric world that has characterized most 
of world history. In many regards, our contemporary world has more resemblances with 
the thirteenth than with the twentieth century. But what does it look like exactly? We 
don’t know yet but we can see tendencies and contours. Let me briefly describe some of 
them. 
First, the rise of the global South has an impact on the global division of labour. The 
young populations, especially in India and China, will contribute as much to the global 
labour force as the entire West. As they continue to work for comparatively low wages, 
outsourcing from the West will continue. Along with labour-intensive production, high-
end production will also increase in the global South as populations enjoy increasing 
levels of education and investment. The rise of India’s IT sector is well-known and 
speaks for itself. 
In production, trade and politics we see an increasing cooperation between countries of 
the global South. It may not be very efficient yet – as indicated by the fact that our In-
dian colleague did not get a visa for this conference in time – but it is real and it is de-
veloping. The G-20 has grown to include most countries of the global South. 
• The interaction between the countries of the global South beyond the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans is historically new. 
At the same time, old ties are being revitalized, such as the silk route and the links 
across the Indian Ocean. The West doesn’t play a role in these. 
Contemporary division of labour and political interaction only partly fit the container 
model of society. Even the large nation states of the global South have very little in 
common with twentieth century Europe and with each other. India and China are old 
civilizations comparable with regions like the Middle East and the whole of Europe, 
while South Africa and Brazil are artificial creations of slave-exploiters. If we go be-
yond states, we see large transnational corporations playing a leading role on the global 
stage.  
• Wal-Mart is China’s number eight trading partner, while General Motors’ 
turnover exceeds the entire GDP of South Africa. Furthermore, states are highly uneven. 
The GDP of the city of Shanghai is half of South Africa’s and bigger than Chile’s, while 
a couple of hundred kilometres from Shanghai, peasants are starving. Within and be-
yond states, movements and organizations play an increasing role. Along with them, 
new forms and structures of the division of labour are emerging, from informal labour 
associations to subcultural networks to the Chinese diaspora. They have little in com-
mon with European capitalism. The container model was applicable only to part of 
Europe’s populations but on a global scale, it grasps very little. Today, there are offi-
cially about 200 million unemployed persons, and there are 500 million underemployed, 
maybe another 500 million housewives and around 3 billion seniors and juniors. Fi-
nally, the number of people working in the so-called informal sector by far exceeds 
formal wage labour. In India for example, three percent of the population works in the 
formal sector. 
What we are seeing is not the emergence of a world society with one integrated struc-
ture. We are rather seeing a complex configuration of flows and scapes, some of which 
are organized as national or global divisions of formal wage labour. With regard to this 
realm of society, we might speak of a functional division of labour in Luhmann’s sense 
and a possible world society. This division of labour is increasingly separated from lo-
cal and national cultures and social structures. In relation to the functional division of 
labour, social structure becomes capitalistic in Bourdieu’s broad sense. People have 
access to labour in relation to their economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. This 
division of labour is spreading to include an increasing number of types of labour and to 
commodify an increasing number of objects. 
Therefore, Wallerstein has argued that we are seeing the emergence of a capitalist world 
system, which he defined as an all-encompassing division of labour. However, at the 
same time that we can observe a spread of this division of labour, we are seeing the per-
sistence and even resurgence of older cultures and social structures that I call sociocul-
tures. Especially in the global South sociocultures like patrimonialism, kinship ties or 
absolutism persist and play an important role in the organization of the social world 
beyond the functional division of labour. Even a country like Germany is not intelligible 
independently of the persistence of feudal corporations and family connections. This is 
all the more true for new phenomena of global importance like the Chinese diaspora or 
the ASEAN. 
On the basis of increasing global integration and the persistence of sociocultures, we 
may discern four tendencies of contemporary globalization. First, the number and qual-
ity of inclusions into networks becomes increasingly important, as Castells has argued. 
This entails an increasing importance of fluid resources like mobility and internet access 
and social connections and a decreasing importance of cultural and fixed capital. Sec-
ond, social groups become particularized. This has nothing to do with individualization 
but with the organization of groups in large, anonymous societies with a highly special-
ized division of labour. Durkheim suggested the emergence of labour associations but 
with the relatively decreasing importance of formal labour other criteria become more 
important for the organization of groups that can basically correspond to any social di-
vision. Third, alternative forms of a division of labour arise that correspond either to 
resurging sociocultures or to hybrids of sociocultures and global tendencies. Fourth, as 
social groups and divisions of labour are increasingly organized according to particular-
ized differences, entirely new sociocultures are arising, such as the Pentecostal move-
ment or the techno-scene. 
 
Theoretical Consequences 
It is evident that the world is growing together, that transnational links are gaining im-
portance and that the container model is outdated. But what consequences do we draw 
from this? Wallerstein has attacked Eurocentrism and tried to overcome it by analyzing 
society as a world system. However, according to Wallerstein this world system com-
prises exactly three classes that are defined by their position in the global division of 
labour. Hereby, Wallerstein merely enlarges the container model to a global scale. 
This is a theoretical problem. According to Hegel and Marx, Wallerstein and Luhmann 
the social world is a totality that either follows one logic or is assimilated to the Euro-
pean logic. If this is the case, all parts of the totality have to follow the same logic. Most 
Eurocentric theories have actually made this claim. According to Hegel and Marx, 
Wallerstein and Luhmann all phenomena that cannot be subsumed under their theories 
do not play a role for understanding the social world. This was convincing as long as 
Europe dominated the world. From this perspective, the rise of the global South would 
either be short-lived or in the end reproduce the entire Eurocentric picture. Both is un-
likely. And even if it were the case, we already saw that at least most of history did not 
function according to the Eurocentric picture. 
In my opinion, there are two theoretical problems about the overarching Eurocentric 
theories that are more serious than their inadequacy to the past and the future. First, they 
are so abstract that they cannot grasp the majority of the social world. The different so-
ciocultures, new social movements, migration, diasporas, multiculturalism, regional 
configurations and global cities are all phenomena that fall through the grid of these 
theories. We could say that precisely that which we consider characteristic of contempo-
rary globalization cannot be seen from this perspective. And it is even worse if we look 
at local social phenomena. 
I would like to put the emphasis on the other theoretical problem however. Thinking in 
terms of a totality comprising one logic is nineteenth century science to me. In the natu-
ral sciences, nobody talks about the container of the universe containing solid bodies in 
certain positions any more. One talks about various space-time-systems that are relative 
to each other and that each have their proper time- and space-structures. I think it is very 
similar with regard to social phenomena. It depends on the purpose and the relation 
where a certain phenomenon, such as a society, begins and ends, how its history relates 
to other histories and which concepts are important. In Wittgenstein’s terms, all socie-
ties merely bear family resemblances and not one overarching logic explained in univer-
sal concepts. 
To exemplify this, we could look at religion. We think this is a clear concept but no-
body has come up with a clear definition and a clear boundary of the concept yet. Is 
animism a religion and if not, do all the animistic or pagan elements within religion 
such as Christmas belong to the religion or not? Is the Pentecostal movement part of the 
church or not? And so on. The point is that phenomena that we classify as religion have 
some traits in common but no trait is common to all and no two phenomena have all 
traits in common. Like the members of a family. This is why Wittgenstein used the term 
family resemblance. 
If we apply this argument to the social world, we will still use universal concepts like 
religion, institution or division of labour, but in each case the concept will have a differ-
ent meaning. It can only be explicated and used in relation to a historically and socially 
specific configuration. We may come up with general categories like action, inequality 
or domination to apply to all phenomena alike. This is what the theory of systems is 
trying to do. But without any link to empirical concepts, these categories do not only 
remain void but are also arbitrary. As soon as we use empirical concepts, we have to 
refer to empirical material, which is singular or particular but not universal. Categories 
may be universal. They are important, can be used in different contexts and frame the 
scientific endeavour. But they are useless in themselves. Empirical concepts on the 
other hand can be translated into other contexts but cannot be applied indifferently to 
them. 
 
To conclude 
The rise of the global South teaches us that our Eurocentric concepts and stories are not 
universal. They apply to a specific time and place. In my opinion, it would be the wrong 
conclusion to say that by the end of this century we will be doing an Indian or a Chinese 
science. And it would also be a wrong conclusion to say that anything goes. We rather 
need to relate empirically saturated analyses using different concepts, contexts and 
propositions to each other in something that I call a configuration or a kaleidoscope. 
Differing stories about different empirical cases may not fit nicely but they do not nec-
essarily have to fit because the cases actually do not match. If you wish, they are differ-
ent time-space-systems. The only thing we have to agree on is the general theory of sci-
ence. Some aspects of it I have just tried to lay out. The core of this theory of science 
might be that we should continue to talk and teach but should start to learn and listen as 
well. This will be especially important since more and more voices will try to make 
themselves heard and some of them will also claim universal truth. 
